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1 
Abstract  
Integrating elements from the Agency Theory and the Life Cycle theory, this study analyses the 
determinants of the manager’s decisions on how to bestow the free cash flow generated during 
the business year. It focuses on the relationship, often characterized by severe friction, between 
managers and investors. Centering exclusively on US public companies, it presents the main 
choices that both investors and management make when considering the “dividend dilemma”. 
In our empirical observations, starting from Academic literature findings, we demonstrate the 
preferences of the institutional investor, an important type of shareholder present in every 
modern public company, especially in the US. This type of shareholder has grown in size and 
influence over the past three decades and is now ‘an actor’ possessing a strong bargaining power 
in relation to the management of a firm. Through empirical evidence, we prove that the 
institutional investors’ preferences regarding the distribution of the firm’s liquidity, are 
repurchasing companies and firms that pay low and medium dividends. Finally, our results 
allow us to theorize on some key points that managers should consider when seeking the 
optimal payout policy for the firm and all the stakeholders. 
 
Key words 
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Abstract Italiano 
Integrando elementi della Teoria dell'Agenzia e della Teoria del Ciclo di Vita, questo studio 
analizza le determinanti delle decisioni del manager su come impiegare i free cash flow generati 
durante l'esercizio. Si concentra sul rapporto, spesso caratterizzato da forti attriti, tra manager 
e investitori. Centrato esclusivamente sulle società pubbliche statunitensi, lo studio presenta le 
principali scelte che sia gli investitori che il management fanno quando si considera il "dilemma 
dei dividendi". Nelle nostre osservazioni empiriche, partendo dai risultati della letteratura 
accademica, dimostriamo le preferenze dell'investitore istituzionale, un importante tipo di 
azionista presente in ogni azienda pubblica moderna, soprattutto negli Stati Uniti. Questo tipo 
di azionista è cresciuto in dimensioni e in influenza negli ultimi tre decenni; è ora un attore con 
un forte potere contrattuale nei confronti della gestione di un'azienda. Attraverso prove 
empiriche dimostriamo che le preferenze degli investitori istituzionali, per quanto riguarda la 
distribuzione della liquidità dell'azienda, sono aziende che riacquistano azioni proprie e aziende 
che pagano dividendi bassi e medi. Infine i nostri risultati ci permettono di teorizzare alcuni 
punti chiave che i manager dovrebbero considerare quando cercano la politica di payout 
ottimale per l'azienda e per tutti gli stakeholder. 
 
Key words 
Payout policy, conflict of interest, principal-agent relationship, agency costs, free cash flow 
problem, incentive control mechanism, self-control theory, quality of management. 
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4 
Introduction 
 
At the end of 2003, for the first time in its history, Microsoft announced it would 
distribute to its shareholders a dividend of $ 0.08 per share. What led the company to put an 
end to 28 consecutive years without dividends was, according to the then CFO John Connors, 
the need to satisfy investors’ requests regarding rolling out the abundant amount of cash in the 
coffers of the personal computer system pioneer (a total of $ 40 bn was distributed to 
shareholders). What this piece of history tells us is that managers have to consider stakeholders’ 
wishes carefully regardless of company size, as investors play an important role in giving the 
enterprise the resources it requires. Almost sixteen years later, the influence wielded by 
investors is by no means lower and weaker, especially considering that of institutional investors. 
Managers, therefore, have become keen to seek out what is best to increase value for long-term 
shareholders for they are fully aware that their overall relationship with investors ultimately 
depends on the firm’s liquidity distribution. 
 In this study, we are going to analyze the influence exerted by corporate payout policy 
on management decisions. All profit and non-profit organizations exist because behind them 
there are individuals and groups creating and building relationships. Developing networks and 
providing liaising, they obviously expect to receive a return from their investment and effort 
either in financial or other terms. 
Our goal is to look in depth at corporate governance, especially in public organizations, 
and to observe executive and top management decisions, where these are clearly recognizable, 
with regard to payout policy. Along with many other business activities, such as business 
planning and marketing, this type of policy contributes to the firm’s performance and can 
influence and shape, to different extents, its daily decisions, structure and overall results. 
 To answer the question “Does payout policy inform us about the quality of 
management?”, focus will be on the investor-manager relationship in the search for empirical 
evidence of the key role played by investors in driving managers towards a payout policy that 
satisfies both parties. Academic literature on principal-agent relationship, since Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), has thoroughly identified and demonstrated the negative effects (agency 
costs) arising from friction between these two main groups of stakeholders. Such friction turns 
into costs which, as far as payout policy is concerned, are related to the firm’s liquidity 
distribution issue, the so-called “free cash flow problem”. The theory of conflict of interest 
between the manager in charge of the company and the shareholders who delegate, dates back 
to the times of Adam Smith when he first pointed out the shortcomings of the “separation and 
control” decision: 
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“The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over 
it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to 
small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation 
from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company”. (Adam Smith, 1776) 
 
The present analysis is broken down into three parts: in Part 1are presented the findings 
of research studies so far carried out regarding the free cash flow problem and the role played 
by investors and managers in payout policy; Part 2 presents an investigation carried out by 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) on institutional ownership in public companies and, following 
on from past academic studies on investors’ preferences for their firm’s liquidity distribution, 
contains data and observations on a sample number of investors and companies. Such data and 
observations have been constructed with a view to finding and giving empirical confirmation 
of this study’s hypotheses and theories. Part 3 presents the results and sets out the theoretical 
and practical implications of the study. 
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1 Literature Review 
 
1.1 Dividend Policy 
 
1.1.1 The enigma of dividends 
 Academic literature on dividend policy has often labelled dividends as an enigma (Fama 
and French, 2001). Dividends, the amount of money firms decide to give to shareholders as a 
return on their investments, hide many contradictions and features in spite of the apparent clear 
definition of dividend itself: the basic essence of dividends consists in the possibility to 
distribute some of the wealth a firm has generated with its activities to those subjects –the 
shareholders– who have some claim to a share of the outcome of these activities as a return of 
their share in the risks incurred by the business. Those who are entitled to decide whether to 
distribute dividends or not are the managers of the firm (upon approval of their Board of 
Directors). At this point, the shadow of a first friction between managers and shareholders 
becomes apparent: the distribution of earnings the single shareholder has the right to receive, 
depends ultimately on managers’ decision. 
 Before moving to analyze the relationships between shareholders and managers, and the 
several points of friction that can occur between these two groups, we shall frame the role of 
dividends on the management’s work. Cash flow, generated by a firm’s activity, can be 
employed by management in different ways as: (i) a dividend payout: the free cash flow is 
distributed to shareholders as cash dividends; (ii) share repurchases: the firm buys back some 
of its shares which are in circulation; (iii) interest and capital payments: in the case of indebted 
firms; (iv) investments in new projects or financial instruments: for new growth opportunities; 
(v) an increase of cash reserves: as a guarantee for future payments. 
 Literature on corporate payout policy since Modigliani and Miller’s “irrelevance 
propositions” (1961) has identified many reasons why certain firms pay dividends and why 
others do not, why dividend distribution can vary depending on the size, profitability and 
growth opportunities of the company and how certain types of stakeholders, like institutional 
investors can influence and direct management’s optimal payout policy. In the course of this 
study the focus will be not on payout policy determinants, but rather on putting forward the 
payout theory we think best explain why firms pay dividends which is “the life-cycle theory” 
and only briefly will taxation differences between dividends and share repurchases among 
corporations be addressed; the literature review regarding these two parts will be covered in the 
following two subsections (1.1.2 and 1.1.3). 
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 The main part of the study will focus, instead, on the influence single investors or group 
of investors contribute to management’s decision on payout policy, the agent costs that emerge 
between the management of a corporation and its shareholders regarding the “free cash flow 
problem” and the opinion on the work of the management we can formulate, considering 
exclusively the management’s decisions on payout policy (literature review sections: 1.2, 1.3, 
and 1.4). 
 
1.1.2 Dividends and share repurchases 
 The corporate payout policy involves firms distributing available cash flows to 
shareholders through two operations: dividends and repurchase; in the case of an indebted firm, 
part of the cash flow is also used for interest and capital repayments to creditors. In order to 
decide which of the two operations is more favorable for the firm’s value, taxes have to be 
considered. With that premise, taxation on dividends and repurchases differ from country to 
country and firm to firm (on the basis of size, operations sector and type of company), dividends 
are generally taxed at a higher rate than those of capital gains in the most financially developed 
markets. In the US, taxation on dividends has a higher incidence than that on capital gains, with 
some exceptions regarding the individual contract and the length of time the financial 
instrument has been held; for example, the tax rates of capital gains for shares that are retained 
for a period between sixty-one days and a year and the differences between ordinary and 
qualified dividends and long term and short term capital gains. Therefore, in the case of tax 
rates which are higher for dividends than capital gains, the optimal payout policy for the firm 
and its shareholders is favoring share repurchases over dividends. The fact that firms continue 
to make a wide use of dividends in their payout policy in spite of the tax disadvantage that can 
exist, the so called “dividend puzzle”, suggests that there are other explanations that managers 
take into consideration when deciding how to dispose of free cash flow. One such explanation 
is the role and choices of certain investors, such as institutional investors, which will be 
analyzed in a later section (1.3.1). 
 To confirm the tendency and dividend puzzle theory of favoring dividends to share 
repurchases, we can consider the following empirical observations, as indicated by 
Constantinides et al (2003), on payout policy across the largest firms in terms of market 
capitalization in developed countries: (i) dividends and share repurchases are strongly favored 
among these firms and represent a high percentage of the earnings distributed to shareholders; 
(ii) the tax rates for long term capital gains (shares held for more than one year) have commonly 
been lower than those for dividends; (iii) dividends, historically, have been the preferred means 
of wealth distribution to shareholders; from the mid 1980s, share repurchases have been used 
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more and more often by large corporations; (iv) the incidence of tax payments for dividends is 
higher than those of capital gains, both for individuals (mainly those in high tax brackets) and 
large corporate companies. 
 Academic literature and empirical observation would seem to be suggesting that the 
optimal payout policy, in the case of different taxation, would be to favor the extensive use of 
share repurchases over payout of dividends, as the latter is economically disadvantageous from 
a taxation point of view. In the following sections an explanation will be sought for management 
decisions, for the “dividend puzzle”. 
 
1.1.3 Life-cycle theory 
 Having briefly summarized the nature of dividends and share repurchases, and the tax 
issues that oppose them, we now present the theory that best explains for us what determines 
corporate payout policy. 
The life-cycle theory, conceived by Mueller (1972), describes how managers modify 
their internal payout policy during the growth process of the firm: in the early years the firm is 
forced to reinvest the cash flow generated in order to meet the broad investment opportunity 
set, meaning that dividends and share repurchases are reduced to zero. As the firm grows and 
the range of profit investment shrinks, management starts to distribute liquid funds to 
shareholders, in the form of dividends and share repurchases. As the firm progresses, the risk 
of disagreements concerning the firm’s payout policy between managers and shareholders 
increases: the “agency cost” emerges, with significant consequence. 
 Academics Denis and Osobov, based on Mueller’s work, go on to analyze the conflict 
that emerges between the two groups (managers and shareholders) as the corporation moves 
forward. According to Denis and Osobov’s agency cost-based life-cycle theory (2006), 
managers’ decision about payout policy is affected by the need to dispense the free cash flow 
generated by the firm’s activities. In their cross-sectional analysis of firms from six different 
developed countries, they find empirical evidence that the amount of distributed dividends 
increases along the life cycle of the firm: young firms tend to distribute fewer dividends to 
shareholders as free cash flow is used to invest in new growth opportunities, whereas mature 
firms distribute greater dividends and buyback more shares as their free cash flow now 
surpasses their investment need. Denis and Osobov find, furthermore, that in all the six 
countries analyzed (US, Canada, UK, France, Germany and Japan), the most profitable firms 
are the largest dividend payers, suggesting that mature firms present a higher risk of agency 
costs of cash retention compared to smaller firms, as the investment opportunity set of these 
two macro groups differs. 
 
9 
 Progressing in their life-cycle, profitable firms dispose of more cash flow: a certain 
amount of it is employed for investment, reserves and interest payments, and the rest is ear-
marked by shareholders; therefore, for mature firms that dispose of significant volumes of cash 
flow, the degree of friction between the agent (managers) and the principal (shareholders) 
increases as management may prefer to invest rather than diminish the firm’s cash flow through 
dividends or share repurchases. 
 
1.2 Agency costs 
 
1.2.1 Agent-principal relationship 
 The “agency relationship” is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), as “a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent”. As both the principal and agent aim at maximizing their own utility function, 
inefficiency and costs arise from this relationship. Such costs, the so-called “agency costs”, 
consist of: “the sum of: (i) the monitoring expenditures by the principal; (ii) the bonding 
expenditures by the agent; (iii) the residual loss”. In large public companies, characterized by 
a widespread division of capital among a myriad of small shareholders and by the presence of 
institutional investors, agency costs arise prominently regarding the free cash flow problem 
(subsection 1.2.2). 
 According to the agent-principal relationship, the manager is in a privileged position 
compared to the shareholder, as he has access to inside information concerning the company’s 
activities that outsider stakeholders are not party to. This imbalance of information between 
ownership and control, explains the rise of all those costs necessary for shareholders to control 
management and for managers to reassure owners they are following the owner’s interests. 
Regarding corporate payout policy, the agent and the principal are in contrast over free cash 
flow distribution. 
 Free cash flow, as exposed by Jensen (1986) is “cash flow in excess of that required to 
fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of 
capital”. The problem of how to manage and employ the cash flow is better observable for large 
corporations (such those on the S&P index, which hosts an optimal group of firms with a regular 
payout policy and with the overall highest sum of dividends distributed). In large public 
companies, the executives, in charge of the firm’s payout policy, are faced with a number of 
options for optimal payout policy. These options are influenced by many variables, including 
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make-up of shareholders, number of institutional investors and banks, role of bondholders, 
management’s contracts and financial statutes. 
 
1.2.2 The free cash flow problem 
 The free cash flow problem concerns the distribution of the liquidity generated by the 
firm’s activities to the owner of corporate shares. Managers and shareholders have different 
point of views of how to dispose of these funds, as their objectives are not generally aligned; 
the manager presents his own interest that on many occasions can differ substantially from those 
of the shareholder: corporate managers, the agents of equity owners, have conflicting interests 
with those on whose behalf they operate. 
 One reason for the existence of such a conflict of interests over payout policy, is the fact 
that payouts to shareholders reduce the funds the manager can control; such a reduction impacts 
management decisions on the investment planned, forcing executives to obtain additional 
resources from markets as debt capital, which in turn, is monitored by the capital markets that 
judge the work of management also in terms of corporate leverage. Managers, therefore, prefer 
to use the cash flow resources to invest and expand the company, even though this can imply 
pushing beyond the optimal size of the firm, as management’s reputation and remuneration 
grows in line with company expansion sales growth being associated with a positive trend to 
changes in compensation clauses. 
 In the presence of a significant amount of free cash flow, the conflict of interest 
regarding corporate payout policy may intensify; managers want to meet as many growth 
opportunities as possible, whereas shareholders try to motivate the management “to disgorge 
the cash rather than investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization 
inefficiencies” (Jensen, 1986). In the event that the shareholders obtain a significant increase in 
dividend payouts or stock repurchasing, managers will be also compelled to keep the level of 
payment high as dividend and share repurchase cuts are often viewed by the market in a 
negative light; this fact, therefore, proves another explanation of management’s aversion to 
dividend and share repurchases distribution. Capital markets, in fact, can punish changes to 
corporate payout policy that reduces the amount of resources given to the investors; empirical 
observations show that both dividends and share repurchase cuts correspond to a fall in the price 
of company stock. 
 
1.2.3 Incentive control mechanisms 
“Corporate governance can be described as a common agency problem” (Constantinides 
et al 2003): the problem involves the management (agent) and the ownership (principal). To 
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avoid the risk of the agent’s behaving in an opportunistic manner, besides monitoring the daily 
actions of the work of management through the capital market, the principal can use agent 
compensation as an effective tool to bring conflicting interests back into line. 
As demonstrated by Smith and Watts (1982), shareholders dispose of many tools in 
order to control the work of management and try to minimize agency costs involved in the free 
cash flow problem. The first to be considered here is the contractual control mechanism: one 
way of checking that management does not over-invest is to set up a compensation scheme that 
rewards managers when they act to maximize the value of the firm; an example of this type of 
incentive plan is the bonus plan calculated with a function that includes dividend payout ratio. 
The market control mechanism, instead, consists of conferring to the labor and capital markets 
the role of deciding whether management is increasing or depleting the value of the firm. The 
third incentive mechanism is salary renegotiation, the most used type of compensation plan in 
the US, which provides that the salary of the manager is renegotiated according to the changes 
of the company’s market value. 
 All these executive control mechanisms link management’s remuneration to company 
performance parameters, such as earnings, payout ratio, and stock price, to name but a few. The 
payout ratio can be used as a benchmark for dividend incentives; such an incentive in the 
executive compensation plan, as demonstrated by White (1996), is positively related to an 
increase in dividend payouts and yields. High distribution of dividends may also commit the 
management to keeping the payout ratio constant or with but a few minor changes, as the capital 
market (through the investors’ expectations) responds negatively with cuts in corporate 
payouts. 
 Another incentive control mechanism can be identified in stock options: with stock 
options offered to managers the company decreases the risk of conflict of interest and aligns 
management and shareholder interests. Managers who own stock options are motivated to 
increase the value of the firm and so push up the stock price; however stock options have been 
shown to make management come down on the side of share repurchase as opposed to 
dividends as tax advantage for capital gains surpass benefits from dividends (such as no 
transaction costs). As argued by Fenn and Liang (2001), “management stock options induce a 
substitution away from dividends toward open market repurchases”, proving that stock options 
are not “dividend protected”. Even though, as stated by White (1996), managers who own 
company shares are less averse to dividend distribution than those who do not hold company 
stock, as a manager-shareholder benefit directly from a dividend payout operation, they tend to 
favor share repurchases to dividends (many studies ((Lambert et al (1989); Jagannathan (2001); 
Fenn and Liang (2001)) have proved stock options plans prompt managers to change payout 
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policy, substituting dividends payouts with share repurchase). Nevertheless, stock options plans 
can motivate managers to reduce the amount of potential over-investment and can represent, 
therefore, a useful tool for shareholders to mitigate the “agency costs of cash retention” (Denis 
and Osobov, 2006). 
 
1.3 Investors 
 
1.3.1 Types of investors 
In US public companies ownership is divided among many investors; to generalize there 
are two main types of investors: the large investor and the small investor. These two macro-
groups differ from one another in how much information they hold on the company they invest 
in; large investors (also called institutional investors), are professional, informed shareholders 
who are highly motivated to monitor the company and the capital market, being majorly 
involved in view of the huge sums they manage. Large investors not only have the motivation 
and duty to monitor the market (as they themselves gather the investments of smaller 
shareholders) but also the know-how to identify the optimal form of payout policy that best 
increases their own utility. Such high levels of information and involvement by institutional 
investors in the capital market is seen favorably by management as they can benefit from the 
presence of these large investors, using them as guarantors of their company operations (i.e. 
M&A). Large investors therefore, are the first stakeholder management considers in its daily 
decisions on company activities. 
The second macro-group mentioned above – the small investor– comes after the 
institutional investor. The small investor is typically the shareholder who has neither the 
resources nor the technical knowledge to monitor Management’s work and decisions with the 
same accuracy and effectiveness of the professional investor. Small investors are also generally 
pooled by large institutional funds, such as mutual and pension funds, and are therefore 
subjected to the opportunism of the management of both the company and the institutional fund. 
There are of course laws and regulations in place to  protect small investors in situations where 
they are disadvantaged due to the information gap, for instance  the “prudent man rule”, but, 
nevertheless, their interests are represented by third parties who have their own interests to look 
after as well. 
Much of the stock-holding of large public companies is in the hands of several types of 
investors who can influence management choices regarding corporate payout policy. 
Institutional investors, especially, are the ones with the greatest influence on policy, those 
whom management must take into consideration as they decide how to employ free cash flow. 
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Among institutional investors, such as banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies 
and pension funds, these last play a major role (especially in the US market) in directing 
management as regards fund allocation as they are the main holders of dividend stocks. 
 Investors differ from one another in the degree of tolerance of risk, taxation and level 
of information; different  tax rates, as previously mentioned, can influence the choice between 
dividend and share repurchase; in particular in the US, shares held by investors in pension funds 
are not subject to taxation on dividends nor on capital gains and represent the larger amount of 
all the dividend paying shares in circulation in the capital market. Management, therefore, will 
be more inclined to favor a pension fund’s choice if this group of investor holds a significant 
share in the company. Differences in tax options create the so-called “client effect”, whereby a 
company's dividend policy is optimized according to the tax choices of its investor clientele 
(Allen and Michaely, 2003, in Constantinides 2003). 
 Company investors (especially when many are grouped together) possess, therefore, 
significant bargaining power vis a’ vis management, as, according to the “Wall Street Rule”, 
they can sell their shares if they are not satisfied with the management’s work (for example 
concerning payout policy). In this way, investor pressure can overcome the so-called 
“management entrenchment” phenomenon and drive management to distribute liquidity. The 
management entrenchment theory, relative to payout policy, holds that managers choose a low 
leverage and keep high cash reserves in order to avoid debt procedures that could damage their 
reputation. 
 
1.3.2 Small investors’ preferences for dividends 
 Tax preferences, as mentioned in subsections 1.1.2, can have a major role in directing 
the investor’s decision towards dividends or share repurchase. In some cases, however, 
investors would prefer the manger to distribute dividends instead of buying back shares, despite 
the tax disadvantages of dividends (especially in the case of small investors). There may well 
be, therefore, other reasons, more related to the psychology and behavior of the investor rather 
than tax incentives, which can explain an investor’s decision (Constantinides, 2003). 
 Even greater confirmation that investors’ preferences are not always based on taxation 
issues can be observed in the case of pensions. US pension and mutual funds bring together the 
investments of a myriad small investors which are not subject to dividend or capital gains 
taxation; hence, taxation cannot be considered to be the primary reason behind the small 
investor’s choice. There are, however, other explanations that can help us understand an 
investor’s apparently curious behavior. Three shall be considered below. 
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 The first concerns the law of the “prudent man”; this requires institutions in the US such 
as pension and mutual funds, to purchase dividend-paying stocks as they represent the interests 
of a type of investor who is more exposed to the agency cost issue. The second concerns 
transaction costs: investors who need a steady income from their investments prefer to receive 
a regular amount at established time intervals rather than sell their shares to obtain a capital 
gain, as the transaction costs of disinvesting (brokerage commissions, time spent, endeavor) 
would outstrip the taxation disadvantages of dividends (especially for small investors who need 
dividends for “consumption reasons” (Constantinides et al, 2003)). 
 The third explanation, developed by Shefrin and Statman (1984) attributes to the 
investor’s psychology the primary reason behind payout preferences. Dividends can be used by 
investors to manage the self-control problem (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981): this issue applied to 
payout preferences would suggest that if an investor can choose how much to spend, it is likely 
they will spend more than they can afford; dividends would be a way of removing this decision 
from the subjective sphere of the investor, making him spend only such monies as are paid in 
the form of dividends; instead, if the investor gained only by selling his shares, there is the risk 
he would not control himself and so liquidate a higher percentage of his shares than he actually 
needs. As illustrated by Constantinides et al (2003), Shefrin and Statman’s theory affirms that 
“by having money in the form of dividends rather than capital gains, people avoid having to 
make decisions about how much to consume. Thus, they avoid letting the agent in them behave 
opportunistically”. 
 Small investors tend, therefore, to prefer dividends to share repurchases. Due to the 
adverse selection and consequently asymmetric information between management and investor, 
small investors tend to consider dividends to be more secure remuneration compared with share 
repurchases. As in Akerlof’s “market of lemons”, small investors will always prefer dividends 
to repurchases even in situations when share repurchases are more economically advantageous 
(thanks, for example, to the different taxation). 
 
1.3.3 Large investors’ preferences for repurchases 
Institutional investors, unlike small investors, are less concerned with the adverse 
selection problem as they possess a high level of information and have greater involvement in 
the company’s activities: involvement that, as mentioned before, is often also encouraged by 
the company itself as they can benefit from  the presence of professional shareholders in 
situations like takeovers. Although the small investor will tend to prefer dividends for the 
reasons noted above, large investors can have equally important reasons for receiving dividends 
but also for repurchases. The dividend reason is related to the limitations imposed by law, such 
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as the “prudent man-rule” (especially for pension funds) and the requirements of the small 
investors they represent and whose resources they are charged to manage (steady cash payments 
in the form of dividends). The repurchase reason is related, instead, to the tax advantage that 
institutions have for share repurchases: they prefer management to distribute resources in the 
form of repurchases as they are less costly both for the company’s finances and for them. 
Granted that  regulations, tax advantages and risk tolerance can vary among large 
investors, institutional investors will likely seek a payout policy that satisfies their needs 
regarding both dividends and share repurchase payouts. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
 
The literature review presented in the first part allows us now to concentrate on the main 
question to be answered with this study: “Does payout policy inform us about the quality of 
management?”.  Regarding payout policy, there are two main parties to consider carefully: 
managers and investors/shareholders. We believe  arge investors rather than small investors 
represent the type of shareholder that is more likely to influence  management’s decisions on 
payout policy for the reason stated in the previous sections; therefore, the first part of the survey 
will investigate the ownership of institutional investors in US public companies that present a 
different payout policy: the hypothesis being  that large investors own a significant number of 
shares in companies that present a payout policy that satisfy the investors’ needs, needs that 
take the form of repurchases and dividend payments as far as payout policy is concerned. 
Starting from previous academic research, by economists Michaley and Grinstein 
(“Institutional holdings and payout policy “, 2005), the aim is to identify as precisely as possible 
these large investors’ preferences. 
The second part, instead, will look at the manager’s side and theorize which are the main 
key points that helps one judge the quality of management. The research question posed is 
relevant not only because of the sums involved in payout policy but also because this type of 
policy is crucial in the relationship between managers and shareholders, who are the main actors 
in any public company. The questions to be answered in the survey that appears in the next 
section are: 
- Do institutional investors prefer a certain type of payout policy? 
- If some general preferences can be identified, can the management’s work be judged upon 
whether or not it considers investors’ requests? 
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2 Method 
 
2.1 Quantitative Research  
 
 The research design chosen for the study is the quantitative method. The choice here 
fell on the quantitative method primarily because of the need to have available a large amount 
of data for several trends of the firms considered (including the number of shares, stock prices, 
earnings, dividends and share repurchases). The qualitative method could have been used 
alongside the quantitative research as counter evidence of the implications drawn from the 
analysis of the data, had it possible to interview managers directly; however, it is believed that 
the quantitative research will prove an equally useful method to find a pattern in the decision-
making process of managers regarding payout policy. 
 The quantitative method (or quantitative research) is generally used for social and 
natural sciences (such as physics, sociology, marketing, economics and political sciences) to 
study observable phenomena, systematically, through empirical observation (direct and 
indirect) and investigation; after the initial part involving gathering information and findings, 
data are analyzed using various techniques, using statistical, computational and mathematical 
tools. Quantitative research is based on the use of scientific theories, theorems, hypotheses and 
mathematical models to give a plausible explanation of the phenomena considered. 
 Data collection, in quantitative research, is characterized by a low degree of interaction 
with the respondent, resulting in a lower risk of data contamination by the researcher (the exact 
opposite of  qualitative research which uses various types of interviews, such as diagnostic, 
information and composite interviews, as the main means to collect data, and where 
contamination is more likely to occur due to the closeness between  interviewer and  
interviewee). An essential feature of quantitative analysis is the formalism that characterizes 
the procedures: the collection, processing and use of data matrix and the use of statistics follow 
defined and easily replicable protocols. This high formalization allows the researcher to detect 
and store a large amount of information with highly standardized tools (that are also rigid). 
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2.2 Research Field 
 
2.2.1 Field of inquiry 
The field of research covers publicly-traded US companies and US institutional 
investors. Analysis of the data gathered proceeds in two steps. In the first part (presented in 
Section 2.3) the data from an existing academic article (“Institutional Holdings and Payout 
Policy”, from the Journal of American Finance Association (2005), by Grinstein and Michaely) 
on institutional ownership in US public companies during the period 1980 and 1996 is 
considered. In the second 100 US publicly-traded companies as of beginning of 2019 will be 
looked at and institutional ownership quantified for each company. The public companies 
sampled for the second part were chosen from the Nasdaq, the second largest stock exchange 
in the world, after the NYSE, using the Nasdaq dividend yield index, which ranked 949 US 
public companies from highest dividend yield stocks to lower dividend yield stocks (from the 
period February-April 2019), as a source for the companies selected for the sample. The 
companies are shown in three tables: Table 5, the 25 lowest dividend yield stocks present in the 
Nasdaq dividend yield index; Table 6 the 25 highest dividend yield stocks; and in Table 7, 50 
companies with a medium dividend yield. Following Grinstein and Michaely, financial and 
utility companies were excluded from the sample. Table 5 is presented in section 2.3 below, 
while Table 6 and 7 are in the Appendix. 
 
2.2.2 US public companies 
The choice of focusing on US institutions and public companies was driven by the need 
to dispose of a group of firms and investors that would be representative for our analysis of 
manager-investor relationship and the resulting effects on payout policy. US public companies 
are characterized by the presence of large investors and a myriad qsmall shareholders; in such 
a structure there is not a main equity holder that can direct the decisions of  managers; the 
management of such companies can therefore escape shareholder control more easily compared 
to other countries, such as France, Germany, Japan, and the UK, where there is often a main 
shareholder holding the majority of the shares (a bank, a founding member or a family). 
Analyzing exclusively US firms can therefore allow us to focus on large publicly-traded firms, 
where conflicts of interest are most severe, especially concerning cash flow distribution. The 
free cash flow problem is more likely to occur and is more significant in the case of huge 
amounts of liquidity whose use is mainly decided by the managers of large companies: US 
publicly-traded companies represent therefore an optimal sample for this study which aims to 
investigate manager-investor conflict of interest and its effects on payout policy. 
 
18 
2.2.3 Two researches combined 
The first part of the study, based on past academic research into institutional investors 
and public companies in the US, represents an optimal picture of the situation between 1980 
and 1996 of institutional holdings ownership in publicly-traded firms; 1980 also, represents the 
beginning of the share repurchase policy by US firms. The second part, instead, continues the 
analysis started by Grinstein and Michaley of institutional investors’ ownership in publicly-
traded companies in the US, by providing empirical confirmation of large investors’ preferences 
regarding dividend policy. Finally, the results from both these inquiries are compared 
explanations set out in Section 3.2 below. 
 While Grinstein and Michaely analyse how institutional ownership varies among 
companies with different forms of dividend and share repurchases payouts, the present study 
involving the 100 sample companies will focus on dividend payments only. 
 
2.3 Data Collection 
 
2.3.1 Grinstein and Michaely’s findings 
Firstly, the four tables from Grinstein and Michaely on the ownership percentage of 
institutions in US publicly-traded companies between 1980 and 1996 are given below. The 
institutional investors considered are those with a total investment of more than 100 million 
dollars, whose data regarding institutional stocks were gathered from section 13F of the U.S. 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among the subjects that are required by law to 
show their investments in shares and total value under section 13F of SEC, can be found also 
those institutional investors with “investment discretion over 100 million dollars”, including 
pension funds, mutual funds, bank trusts, hedge funds, insurance companies and investment 
advisors. The firms whose shares the institutions own are US publicly-traded companies, again 
from the period between 1980 and 1996, with the exclusion of utility and financial companies; 
the total number of firms sampled is 79,010 grouped into 5 classes by size of company in terms 
of market capitalization. 
 Table 1 and Table 2 show the percentage of shares owned by institutional holdings in 
dividend paying and non dividend paying firms and in firms paying low, medium or high 
dividends. Table 3 and Table 4, instead, show ownership of institutional holdings in 
repurchasing and non repurchasing firms and in firms that pay low, medium and high 
repurchase prices. Each table is divided into 5 quintiles, on the basis of company size, and 
presents the median and mean (in brackets) value percentage, and the number of observations 
(under the column flagged #), each unit corresponding to a publicly traded firm. The sixth row 
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presents the total value weighted median and mean and the total number of observations for 
each category. The rationale behind the distribution of observations, by Grinstein and Michaely, 
was to have available  an equal number of units for the three categories: low, medium and high 
dividends, and low, medium and high repurchases; this rationale can be noticed both in Table 
2 and Table 4 a: the number of observations is equally distributed among the three categories 
(6410, 6466 and 6522 observations for dividend paying firms) and (4031, 4030 and 4031 
observations for repurchasing firms). 
 
Table 1 
 
Source: Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
Source: Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
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Table 3  
 
 
 
Source: Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
 
Source: Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
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2.3.2 Nasdaq dividend yield index 
Table 5 gathers the 25 US companies, chosen from the Nasdaq index, with the lowest 
dividend yield gathered in ascending order. Next to the dividend yield is shown the annual 
dividend (in $ as of 2019), the institutional ownership and the business sector. The last row 
presents the average mean for the three parameters. Table 6 and Table 7, which show the data 
on institutional ownership for firms that pay medium and high dividends are presented in the 
Appendix. 
 
Table 5 
 
Company Dividend yield 
Annual 
dividend ($) 
Institutional 
ownership Industry 
Encore Wire Corp. 0,14% 0,08 86,10% Capital goods 
Pegasystems Inc. 0,17% 0,12 47,04% Technology 
Universal Display 
Corp. 0,24% 0,40 80,77% Capital goods 
Mesa Laboratories, 
Inc. 0,25% 0,64 71,24% Capital goods 
Coca-Cola 
Consolidated, Inc. 0,27% 1,00 51,93% Consumer non durables 
Allied Motion 
Technologies, Inc. 0,32% 0,12 48,50% Capital goods 
The Ensign Group, 
Inc. 0,36% 0,19 81,86% Health care 
NVIDIA Corp. 0,38% 0,64 70,41% Technology 
Bruker Corp. 0,38% 0,16 69,19% Capital goods 
Multi-Color Corp. 0,40% 0,20 77,88% Miscellaneous 
Heartland Express, 
Inc 0,41% 0,08 60,63% Transportation 
Cognex Corp 0,43% 0,20 97,77% Capital goods 
Wingstop Inc. 0,45% 0,36 108,42% Consumer services 
Old Dominion 
Freight Line, Inc. 0,47% 0,68 71,15% Transportation 
Olympic Steel, Inc. 0,50% 0,08 64,34% Basic Industries 
RCI Hospitality 
Holdings, Inc. 0,53% 0,12 48,77% Consumer services 
Winmark Corp 0,56% 1,00 54,36% Consumer services 
MGP Ingredients, 
Inc. 0,59% 0,40 114,98% Consumer non durables 
Ebix, Inc. 0,59% 0,30 78,27% Technology 
Insteel Industries, 
Inc. 0,60% 0,12 81,70% Capital goods 
Blackbaud, Inc. 0,60% 0,48 104,71% Technology 
Landstar System, 
Inc. 0,61% 0,66 103,23% Transportation 
QAD Inc. 0,61% 0,29 54,74% Technology 
Atrion Corp 0,61% 5,4 60,88% Health care 
Marten Transport, 
Ltd. 0,61% 0,12 67,55% Transportation 
Total 0,44% 0,55 74,26% Standard Deviation: 19,76% 
 
 
Source: Nasdaq official site: https://www.nasdaq.com/dividend-stocks/. Own processing. 
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2.4 Data Treatment 
 
The quantitative data collected in the sample of 100 companies were processed using 
statistical analysis. For the first part of Data Collection, findings by researchers Grinstein and 
Michaely were used, who had already organized the data on the companies by size quintiles, 
median and mean of ownership. Instead, for the second part, in the sample of 100 companies 
listed in the Nasdaq dividend yield index for each company was calculated the ratio of the total 
value of shares held by institutional investors to the overall value of the share of every 
considered company and its standard deviation. 
The computation process was possible using the tolls present in the Nasdaq site 
database. The derived data was then grouped using Excel into three different tables, each 
presenting three parameters: dividend yield, annual dividend and the percentage of institutional 
ownership. Each  able presents in the last row the total average mean for the dividend yield (the 
ratio of dividends distributed to stock price), the total average mean for the annual dividend and 
the total average mean of the institutional ownership; then the standard deviation of the 
institutional ownership percentage for each table was calculated (also present in the last row of 
every table). While for Table 5 and Table 6, the sample companies were selected, taking the 
top and bottom 25 companies from the Nasdaq dividend yield index, for Table 7 from the same 
index, 25 companies were selected with the lower annual dividend value and 25 companies 
with the higher annual dividend value, in order to get a medium dividend yield average (Table 
6 and Table 7 are in Appendix). 
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3 Results  
 
3.1 Results Presentation 
 
The following part shows the raw results of institutional ownership of the 100 
companies selected and the results from Grinstein and Michaely (2005) findings, integrated 
with our observations. Results from Tables 1 to 4 are presented and subsequently the results 
generated by the analysis of the sample of 100 companies (Tables 5, 6 and 7). 
Table 1 shows that the institutional ownership total mean is higher for firms that pay 
dividends than firms that do not pay dividends: 36.20% against 18.09%, respectively; looking 
then, at every size quintile (from 1, the lowest to 5, the highest), the trend is the same. It is 
interesting to note that for the highest quantile, the percentage of institutional ownership is 
48.08% with a median value of 49.56% for paying firms and 43.32% with a median of 44.48% 
for non paying firms. 
Table 2, considering only firms that pay dividends, show a total mean percentage of 
institutional investors ownership, for firms that pay low, medium and high dividends of 37.39%; 
37.38% and 33.85% respectively. Considering the different size quintiles, the average mean of 
low and medium dividend paying firms do not always correspond to the total mean (in three 
out of five size quintiles low dividends present a higher institutional ownership percentage than 
medium dividends, as happens for the total average mean), however, firms that pay high 
dividends always show a lower mean than low and medium dividends for every size quintile; 
considering , again, the highest quintile (containing the firms with the highest market 
capitalization), results are  49.13% with a median value of 50.51% for firms that pay low 
dividends; 49.50% with a median value of 50.75% for firms that pay medium dividends and 
45.63% with a median value of 47.74% for firms that pay high dividends. 
 Table 3 presents ownership by institutional holdings in repurchasing and non 
repurchasing firms: these investors own 32.93% and 25.12% respectively; such preference by 
investors for repurchasing shares rather than non repurchasing shares is confirmed for the 
different quintile sizes except for the smallest where non repurchasing is 7.31% value and 
repurchasing 6.82%. Considering the largest quintile the percentage is 50.43% with a median 
value of 53.90% and 52.07% with a median value of 54.11% for firms that pay repurchases and 
for firms that do not pay repurchases, respectively. 
 Table 4 shows the percentage shares owned by institutional holdings in the repurchasing 
firms: the total mean of the percentage of institutional investor ownership, for firms that pay 
low, medium and high repurchases is 32.53%; 32.76% and 33.51% respectively. Considering 
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the total average mean and every size quintile, no common pattern is apparent in investor 
preference for low, medium and high payments, as could be seen in Table 2 for dividend paying 
firms; there is no result that suggests investors definitely prefer low, medium or high 
repurchases: i.e. in the three first quintiles (starting from the lowest), low repurchase is always 
higher than medium and high repurchase; instead, in the remaining two quintiles, medium and 
high repurchases present a higher ownership percentage than low repurchases: in the largest 
size quintile, Table 4 shows that high repurchases present a mean of 53.88% with a median 
value of 55.70%; medium repurchases present a mean of 52.42% with a median value of 
54.18% and low repurchases 49.87% with a median value of 51.83%. 
The e results of the sample of 100 companies gathered to identify large investors’ 
preferences regarding dividend policy, in Table 5 shows that, for companies with the lowest 
dividend yield value (the ratio of dividends distributed to the stock price), the total institutional 
ownership mean is 74.26% with a total mean dividend yield of 0.44% and a mean annual 
dividend of $ 0.55; the standard deviation of  institutional ownership is 19.76%. Table 6, 
considering companies with the highest dividend yield, listed in descending order, presents the 
following results: the total ownership mean for institutions is 48.48% with a total dividend yield 
of 9.23% and a mean annual dividend of $ 1.29; the standard deviation of institutional 
ownership is 27.98%. Table 7, which gathers the data on institutional ownership from 50 US 
companies with a medium dividend yield, presents the following results: the total institutional 
ownership mean is 70.17%, the total dividend yield mean is 2.21% and the mean annual 
dividend $ 1.98; standard deviation of ownership is 26.57%. 
 
3.2 Results Analysis 
 
To proceed to an analysis of the results obtained from the study and from Grinstein and 
Michaely’ findings: focusing exclusively on the latter, the results imply that institutional 
investors preferred (during the period 1980-1996) firms that pay dividends over firms that do 
not distribute dividends (36,20% against 18,09%) and among firms that do pay dividends 
preference is given to low and medium dividend paying firms (37,39% and 37,38%, 
respectively) to high dividend paying firms (33,85%). Even though there would appear to be 
no dominant trend in Table 2, it is safe to say that institutional investors do not necessarily want 
to invest in high dividend paying firms; such a tendency from this type of investor is confirmed 
also by each size quintile. 
The second significant result to be highlighted from Grinstein and Michaely’s research 
is that institutional investors prefer firms that pay repurchases to firms that do not (32,93% 
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against 25,12%) and across repurchase paying firms, the ones that pay medium and high 
repurchases are favored (32,76% and 33,51%) over firms that pay low repurchases (32,53%); 
even though this trend is not confirmed for every size quintile, the overall mean suggests that 
institutional investors tend to avoid firms that do not pay repurchases and firms that pay low 
repurchases: this is especially true for firms that belong to the highest size quintile. 
Grinstein and Michaely’s research confirm our hypothesis that institutional investors 
have preferences regarding the payout policy: they invest more in firms that distribute their 
resources (in terms of cash flow), through dividend and share repurchases,  than in firms that 
avoid remunerating their shareholders: the results show that repurchasing and dividend paying 
firms present higher institutional ownership than firms that present a limited payout policy with 
no resources given to shareholders at all. Table 1 and Table 3 provide proof of such preferences 
by large investors: it is useful to underline once more that dividend paying firms show an 
average total mean higher than firms that do not pay dividends: 36,20 % of institutional 
ownership, while non paying firms return  an average of 18,09 % ownership; then, repurchasing 
firms as well are preferred to firms that do not buyback their shares: repurchasing firms present 
an average total mean of 32,93% of institutional ownership while non repurchasing firms an 
average total mean of 25,12%. 
As previously mentioned in the literature review section, the reason why large investors 
want the firms they invest in to distribute the liquidity obtained during the business year to 
equity holders is that they need a return on their investments. In the capital market where the 
stocks of publicly traded companies are regularly traded, the return on investments for equity 
holders is commonly obtained through capital gains: in this way investors obtain a profit by 
liquidating all or some of their shares. Obviously capital gain can be had also in the absence of 
any form of payout policy (dividend and share repurchase); investors, therefore, by investing 
more in paying firms than in non- paying firms, prove that, besides the common capital gain 
obtained by selling the shares at a higher price than that at which they were previously 
purchased - a gain made possible by the growth of the stock price resulting from the firm’s 
activities during the business year - they expect the firm to distribute free cash flow as well as 
a return of the risk they take by giving resources to the firm. 
Furthermore, such distribution of free cash flow by a firm (either in the form of 
dividends or share repurchases) can have an impact on the stock price of a company (i.e. a rise 
in the level of dividends and share repurchases can make the stock price rise in the event that 
capital markets consider such distribution as a positive sign regarding the company’s resources 
and health), thereby benefitting the shareholder twice: the investor receives a dividend and sees 
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the stock price rise as well, or in case of share repurchase, obtains a higher capital gain than he 
would have obtained if the market did not consider  payout policy changes. 
It is useful to recall that while share repurchase benefits the investor in the same way as 
a common capital gain, as when the company buys back some of its shares the price of each 
stock rises, dividends benefit the shareholder directly through cash payments. Such a difference 
between these two forms of payout help  explain  the different trend in the level of payments 
for dividends and repurchases (comparison between Table 2 and Table 4): investors prefer low 
and medium payments for dividends and  high payments in the case of  share repurchases (even 
though for share repurchases this preference is statistically significant only for companies that 
belong to the highest size quintiles 4 and 5). A reason for such disparity can be found 
considering  the taxation differences between these two forms of payout: dividends are, from a 
taxation point of view, more disadvantageous economically than repurchases; large investors, 
therefore, invest more in companies that pay high share repurchases (as they want to receive a 
return on their investment) and buy stock shares that distribute low and medium dividends 
(reasons why they keep requiring companies to distribute dividends, instead of having 
companies with a payout policy that totally avoids paying dividends, are the small investors’ 
preferences, as mentioned in the literature review and regulation and institutional charts). 
Investor preference for low and medium dividends is confirmed by the survey of the 
sample of 100 companies selected from the Nasdaq index; the results summarized in Table 5, 
6 and 7 show: large investors have their shares mainly in firms that pay low and medium 
dividends (74,26% and 70,17%, respectively) and tend to invest less in firms with a high 
dividend yield (48,48%). Such results confirm, therefore, the hypothesis that investors are not 
indifferent to the form of payout but in fact do have some preferences regarding companies’ 
dividend policy; precisely, low and medium dividends. 
Comparing these findings on institutional investors’ preferences concerning dividends 
with those of Grinstein and Michaely on dividend policy excluding, therefore, share repurchase 
results from Table 3 and Table 4), the conclusion  that can be reached looking at both the 
inquires is that the trend of institutional investors’ preferences is similar: Grinstein and 
Michaely demonstrated that investors tend to prefer low and medium dividend paying firms as 
do the companies analyzed here  in this study. It can be noticed that the percentage of 
institutional ownership has grown for all three types of dividend paying companies (low, 
medium and high): for low paying dividends the increase is from a ratio of 37,39% in the period 
between 1980-1996 to 74,26% in 2019; for medium paying dividend firms, from 37,38% to 
70,17% and for high dividend, from 33,85% to 48,48%. The disparity in the ownership 
percentages from 1980-1996 to 2019, is due to the different periods of time the two enquiries 
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were made: the analysis of the two academics dates back to 1980-1996, whereas this present  
research was conducted on a selection of  sample companies from the 2019 Nasdaq index on 
dividend yields. Between the two periods, institutional holdings in public companies has 
significantly increased, which explains the higher results. Furthermore, these results show that 
the institutional ownership percentage has increased proportionally for both low and medium 
paying dividends firms, while in the case of high dividends, the percentage has increased but 
less significantly. While the significant increase in ownership can be proved by the expansion 
and growth of institutional investors, the differences between low/medium and high uptrends, 
can be explained by the fact that since the mid- 1980s, US regulations on company repurchasing 
of their own shares has spurred US public companies to distribute liquidity with share 
repurchasing (capital gains) instead of  distributing dividends. Thus, large investors started to 
invest more in firms paying low and medium dividends (in order to satisfy the requests of their 
clients, who still wanted dividends, and to comply with “the prudent man rule” imposed by US 
Finance  law) and less often in high dividends (as less advantageous from a taxation point of 
view). 
The results obtained are aligned with the academic theory on payout policy and 
investors’ characteristics mentioned above (Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3). The Institutional investor 
is the main type of stakeholder that management, in publicly traded companies, considers due 
to the high number of shares they own and to the strategic role they can play in boosting the 
company’s reputation. The management in every public company will, therefore, try to satisfy 
the large investors’ requirements in term of payout policy. In the same way as  management 
has to take into consideration its investors’ requirements, so also are large investors compelled 
to for their own small investors. Therefore, the main reason why we keep seeing companies pay 
dividends rather than only repurchasing shares is the fact that large investors want to receive 
dividends because of financial (prudent man rule) and customer (small investors’ needs) 
restraints. 
Considering the limitations and potential errors that might weaken the results arrived at, 
one limitation of the research which must be pointed concerns the sample of companies 
assembled. The sample looks at 100 companies, whereas Grinstein and Michaely consider more 
than 79,000 units. As the significant standard deviation shows, especially for firms with a high 
dividend yield (Table 6), the restricted number of publicly traded companies chosen here, may 
influence the accuracy of the overall results. It might follow, therefore, that the difference in 
percentage ownership resulting here for institutional investors compared to that of Grinstein 
and Michaely could be lower (or higher) than found here. However, the very sources exploited 
for the data collection are themselves a guarantee of reliability. The 2019 Nasdaq dividend yield 
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index and the other sources used to calculate holdings by institutional investors in our sample 
of 100 companies do not undermine the accuracy of the main results. 
 A further element to be taken into account when considering factors that could have 
influenced the research is the time period. The different period considered  could weaken the 
comparison between the two surveys:  in an attempt to prove a continuum with past academic 
research  the differences between the referenced time periods may have been underestimated, 
with the risk that any comparison of the present  sample with past quantitative researches would 
prove useless. However any such difference should only minimally, if at all, affect overall 
results as the sample is supported by academic theories and models. 
These limitations aside,/  Bearing in mind these limitations,  the overall results from 
both the research studies would nonetheless validate the  hypothesis that investors do have some 
preference regarding payout policy and, considering exclusively dividends distribution, it was 
found that institutions in the US tend to invest more in public companies that pay low and 
medium dividends and are not attracted to high dividend paying companies. 
 
3.3 Managerial Implications 
What does this mean for management quality standards in terms of payout policy 
decisions? The second question presented in subsection 1.4: “If some general preferences can 
be identified, can the management’s work be judged upon whether or not it considers investors’ 
requests?”. As demonstrated in the analysis of results, institutional investors do present a 
general preference regarding free cash flow distribution: investors tend to prefer firms that pay 
dividends and repurchase shares to those that do not pay, and among paying firms, the ones that 
distribute low and medium dividends and pay high repurchases are preferred. The advice, 
therefore, for managers of any public companies is that they should consider the following 
aspects when deciding how to address payout policy: 
1. Large investors: if the main equity holders of a company consist of institutional 
investors, managers should meet their needs; both past academic papers and this present 
research show that large investors (especially in the US) own a higher amount of shares 
in public companies that distribute low and medium dividends and pay medium/high 
repurchases; distributing high dividends is no guarantee that investors will be attracted 
and it is also more expensive for the company as it significantly reduces the amount of 
resources that could otherwise be invested in new projects or set aside as reserves. 
2. Small investors: if the company has a significant number of small investors among its 
shareholders or there are pension or mutual funds owning many shares, management 
should consider  distributing medium or even high dividends for the following reasons: 
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pension and mutual funds (especially in the US) have to follow the prudent man rule; 
small investors often prefer to receive a constant fixed dividend as the transaction costs 
of selling their shares might be higher than the capital gains they obtain; the “self-control 
theory” which holds that investors prefer a certain type of liquidity distribution as they 
fear they would spend more in the case of capital gains (the so-called “homemade 
dividends”) than they would with dividends. 
3. Market expectations: the stock market generally views a cut in dividends or share 
repurchases negatively; management, therefore, should think carefully before raising 
the level of dividends distributed, for subsequently turning back to a lower level could 
lead investors to suspect the firm does not have not the resources necessary to fulfil its 
obligations. 
4. Taxes: dividends are subject to higher taxation than capital gains; therefore, from a 
taxation point of view, managers should distribute more liquidity in the form of share 
repurchases than as dividends and in the event of dividends distribution, should avoid 
high dividends. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to answer the following question: ‘Does payout policy inform 
us about the quality of management?’ In order to identify the key points that influence the work 
of management, firstly past academic literature on payout policy was viewed. The data gathered 
from these studies showed that investors prefer firms that repurchase shares and distribute low 
and medium dividends. In the next step, it was shown that the preferences of institutional 
investors remained the same in terms of dividends, as set out in the study by Grinstein and 
Michaely. The results of this present research show that large investors still prefer firms paying 
low dividends to firms paying high dividends. This fact can be accounted for in several ways: 
the most prominent, the tax advantage institutional investors gain when receiving share 
repurchases instead of dividends. 
 Empirical observations outlined above prove that institutional investor choice is driven 
by a particular distribution of the company wealth. The next step was to link investor preference 
with management decision as regards payout policy. Public companies benefit from the 
presence of institutional investors, who nowadays represent more than half the total shares in 
circulation. Therefore, the evidence obtained would suggest that even though managers do not 
adjust their payout policy according to investors’ requests, they do take them into consideration 
and modify their strategy in order to safeguard long-term value for this important group of 
stakeholders. 
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Appendix  
 
Table 6 
 
Company Dividend yield Annual dividend Institutional ownership Industry 
Golar LNG 
Partners LP 13,97% 1,62 34,36% 
Consumer 
services 
New York 
Mortgage Trust, 
Inc. 
13,27% 0,80 44,42% Consumer services 
Green Plains 
Partners LP 12,74% 1,90 27,78% Basic industries 
Salem Media 
Group, Inc. 12,62% 0,26 31,63% 
Consumer 
services 
AGNC Investment 
Corp. 12,41% 2,16 70,25% 
Consumer 
services 
Capital Product 
Partners L.P. 11,95% 1,26 31,18% Transportation 
Tremont Mortgage 
Trust 11,00% 0,88 20,28% 
Consumer 
services 
American Finance 
Trust, Inc 10,88% 1,10 16,59% 
Consumer 
services 
Landmark 
Infrastructure 
Partners LP 
9,58% 1,47 17,19% Consumer services 
Sabra Health Care 
REIT, Inc. 9,34% 1,80 87,37% 
Consumer 
services 
National 
CineMedia, Inc. 8,91% 0,68 94,73% 
Consumer 
services 
Gladstone Capital 
Corp. 8,90% 0,84 11,82% 
Consumer non 
durables 
Capital Southwest 
Corp. 8,62% 1,52 54,14% 
Consumer non 
durables 
Big 5 Sporting 
Goods Corp. 8,51% 0,2 54,81% 
Consumer 
services 
TiVo Corporation 
Institutional 8,21% 7,56 92,85% Miscellaneous 
Manhattan Bridge 
Capital, Inc 8,11% 0,48 14,11% 
Consumer 
services 
Advanced 
Emissions 
Solutions, Inc. 
7,71% 1,00 72,74% Basic industries 
Senior Housing 
Properties Trust 7,25% 0,60 72,68% 
Consumer 
services 
Global Self 
Storage, Inc. 7,04% 0,26 17,71% 
Consumer 
services 
Sotherly Hotels 
Inc. 7,03% 0,50 29,49% 
Consumer 
services 
Psychemedics 
Corp. 6,88% 0,72 56,36% Health care 
Gaming and 
Leisure Properties, 
Inc. 
6,86% 2,72 91,56% Consumer services 
Brookfield 
Property REIT Inc. 6,62% 1,32 87,54% 
Consumer 
services 
Peak Resorts, Inc. 6,31% 0,28 42,59% Consumer services 
Crown Crafts, Inc. 6,15% 0,32 37,88% Basic industries 
Total 9,23% 1,29 48,48% Standard Deviation: 27,98% 
 
 
Source: Nasdaq official site: https://www.nasdaq.com/dividend-stocks/. Own processing. 
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Table 7 
 
Company Dividend yield Annual dividend Institutional Ownership Industry 
Quaterhill Inc 3,50% 0,04 9,96% Miscellaneous 
Reven Housing REIT, 
Inc. 1,19% 0,04 0,29% Consumer services 
Staffing 360 Solutions, 
Inc 2,40% 0,04 2,44%  
Sirius XM Holdings 
Inc. 0,85% 0,05 23,45% Consumer services 
DMC Global Inc. 
Institutional Ownership 0,12% 0,08 89,16% Capital goods 
Heartland Express, Inc 0,41% 0,08 60,63% Transportation 
RF Industries, Ltd 1,07% 0,08 30,26% Capital goods 
Encore Wire 
Corporation 0,14% 0,08 86,10% Capital goods 
Olympic Steel, Inc. 0,50% 0,08 64,34% Basic Industries 
Clarus Corporation 0,73% 0,10 55,34% Consumer non durables 
Office Depot, Inc. 4,78% 0,10 91,59% Consumer services 
Allied Motion 
Technologies, Inc. 0,32% 0,12 48,50% Capital goods 
Insteel Industries, Inc. 0,60% 0,12 81,70% Capital goods 
Marten Transport, Ltd. 0,61% 0,12 67,55% Transportation 
Pegasystems Inc. 0,17% 0,12 47,04% Technology 
RCI Hospitality 
Holdings, Inc. 0,53% 0,12 48,77% Consumer services 
Taitron Components 
Incorporated 1,97% 0,12 13,25% Consumer non durables 
Pan American Silver 
Corp. 1,19% 0,14 116,13% Basic industries 
Bruker Corporation 0,38% 0,16 69,19% Capital goods 
Presidio, Inc. 1,13% 0,16 100,04% Technology 
Lifetime Brands, Inc. 1,78% 0,17 46,65% Capital goods 
The Ensign Group, 
Inc. 0,36% 0,19 81,86% Health care 
Beasley Broadcast 
Group, Inc 5,60% 0,20 55,71% Consumer services 
Big 5 Sporting Goods 
Corporation 8,51% 0,20 54,81% Consumer services 
Cognex Corporation 0,43% 0,20 97,77% Capital goods 
Broadcom Inc. 3,49% 10,60 87,35% Technology 
Equinix, Inc. 2,06% 9,84 92,25% Consumer services 
Amgen Inc. 
Institutional 3,36% 5,80 80,79% Health care 
Atrion Corporation 0,61% 5,40 60,88% Health care 
Cracker Barrel Old 
Country Store, Inc. 2,96% 5,00 86,24% Consumer services 
Lam Research 
Corporation 2,22% 4,40 88,62% Technology 
NVE Corporation 4,95% 4,00 73,56% Technology 
Lamar Advertising 
Company 4,77% 3,84 95,56% Consumer services 
Pepsico, Inc. 2,94% 3,71 72,47% Consumer non durables 
Automatic Data 
Processing, Inc. 1,97% 3,16 81,17% Technology 
Apple Inc. 1,53% 3,08 60,93% Technology 
Texas Instruments 
Incorporated 2,75% 3,08 86,85% Technology 
KLA-Tencor 
Corporation 2,63% 3,00 92,99% Capital goods 
Wynn Resorts 2,20% 3,00 76,64% Consumer services 
Allegiant Travel 
Company 1,97% 2,80 81,97% Transportation 
Gaming and Leisure 
Properties, Inc. 6,86% 2,72 91,56% Consumer services 
Hasbro, Inc. 2,71% 2,72 90,56% Consumer non durables 
Costco Wholesale 
Corporation 1,07% 2,60 71,99% Consumer services 
Lancaster Colony 
Corporation 1,75% 2,60 54,18% Consumer non durables 
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 3,81% 2,52 79,59% Health care 
QUALCOMM 
Incorporated 2,96% 2,48 80,76% Technology 
WD-40 Company 
Institutional 1,49% 2,44 90,22% Basic Industries 
Kaiser Aluminum 
Corporation 2,51% 2,40 97,70% Capital goods 
Regency Centers 
Corporation 3,58% 2,34 99,99% Consumer services 
Cogent 
Communications 
Holdings, Inc. 4,00% 2,32 91,22% Consumer services 
Total 2,21% 1,98 70,17% Standard Deviation: 26,57% 
 
 
Source: Nasdaq official site: https://www.nasdaq.com/dividend-stocks/. Own processing. 
 
